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Introduction 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a comprehensive regional trade 
agreement between Mexico, the United States and Canada (Compa 6). President George H. W. 
Bush signed NAFTA in December 1992, but it was President Clinton who sent NAFTA to the 
Senate for ratification in 1993 (“Trading Away Rights” 1). On January 1, 1994, NAFTA and the 
labor side accord, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, came into effect 
(Caulfield 66). Although signed into law 23 years ago, this piece of legislation remains 
controversial. In the most recent presidential election between Republican Donald Trump and 
Democrat Hillary Clinton, NAFTA was a hot button issue and a point of great contention.  
Throughout the 2016 presidential debates, Donald Trump consistently emphasized the 
unfairness of NAFTA to workers in the United States. Trump stated on his campaign website: 
Tell NAFTA partners that we intend to immediately renegotiate the terms of that 
agreement to get a better deal for our workers. If they don’t agree to a renegotiation, we 
will submit notice that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the deal. Eliminate Mexico’s 
one-side backdoor tariff through the VAT and end sweatshops in Mexico that undercut 
U.S. workers (“Donald J. Trump’s Vision”) 
This statement encapsulates the view that many US politicians and citizens have about trade 
agreements: they are purely business deals. But, the essence of NAFTA offers more than just 
business incentives for member countries, it also provides for the enforcement of labor standards: 
a revolutionary concept in the realm of free trade agreements. NAFTA actually has a side accord, 
which was negotiated at the same time as NAFTA and the North American Agreement on 
Environment Cooperation accord, known as the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC) (Compa 6-7). The NAALC is a labor agreement, which calls on the 
signatories to “enforce their domestic labor standards effectively while working cooperatively 
with the International Labor Organization (ILO)” (McGuinness 6). It was adopted in 1993 to 
“work toward broad improvements in the situation of labor rights in their respective countries” 
(“Trading Away Rights” 1). While an honorable mission, this mission is hardly discussed by the 
American public. 
Although there is much public discourse in the United States on the subject of NAFTA’s  
economic ramifications, few people discuss the NAALC, which is also important. In the 
following sections of my paper, I aim to show that the side agreement to NAFTA, known as the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAACL), does not give adequate protection 
to laborers in Mexico.  To demonstrate this I will: provide background information on NAFTA 
and the NAALC, demonstrate the faults in the NAALC, analyze two cases that went through the 
remedy process laid out in the NAALC, and finally provide recommendations on how this piece 
of legislation can be improved.  
Background 
In this section, I will provide some background on NAFTA and NAALC. This background is 
necessary to understand the chapters that follow. 
What is NAFTA? 
 NAFTA is a comprehensive regional trade agreement between Mexico, the United States, 
and Canada. In essence, “NAFTA provides for the phased elimination of tariff and most nontariff 
barriers on regional trade within 10 years” (Hufbauer and Schott 2). NAFTA also “extends the 
innovative dispute settlement procedures of the FTA to Mexico…; contains precedent-setting 
rights and obligations regarding services and investment; and takes an important first step in 
addressing cross-border environmental issues”( Hufbauer and Schott 2).  The Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the United States was agreed to in 1988, so essentially 
NAFTA is an expansion of this initial agreement to include Mexico (Hufbauer and Schott 2). 
 The book, NAFTA: An Assesment, by Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J Schott, discusses the 
promising features of the agreement. The authors highlight four major features of NAFTA. They 
write:  
First, the NAFTA establishes within 15 years free trade in agricultural products between 
the United States and Mexico. The accord immediately converts key US and Mexican 
agricultural restrictions into tariff-rate quotas and sets a maximum 15-year period for the 
phase-out of the over-quota tariffs–an impressive achievement considering the dismal 
track record of other trade talks in reducing long-standing farm trade barriers. Second, the 
investment obligations of the NAFTA accord national treatment to NAFTA investors, 
remove most performance requirements on investment in the region, and open up new 
investment opportunities in key Mexican sectors such as petrochemical and financial 
services…. Third, the pact sets important precedents for the future regional and 
multilateral negotiations by substantially opening the financial services market in Mexico 
to US and Canadian participants by the year 2000 and by removing significant obstacles 
to land transportation and telecommunication services. Finally, the NAFTA offers a 
schizophrenic result in textiles and apparel. On the one hand, the pact calls for the 
elimination of all tariffs and quotas on regional trade in textiles and apparel. This is the 
first time in this heavily protected sector that imports from an important developing-
country supplier have been significantly liberalized by the United States and Canada 
(Hufbauer and Schott 2-3)  
NAFTA is the first of its kind type, and it set the precedent for the other trade agreements that 
have followed. But, while the NAFTA agreement deals specifically with free trade, the labor side 
accord, the NAALC set about labor provisions that the member countries must adhere to. This 
brings me to the question of have the labor standards been complied with? After 23 years, we are 
now in a position to address this question. For this paper, we will examine the effects the 
NAALC on the rights and wages of the laborers who work in Mexico. 
The Groundwork for NAALC  
 While NAFTA was a groundbreaking trade agreement that encompassed many, never-
before-seen components to a trade agreement, NAFTA left out human rights assurances for 
laborers (Compa 6). Since NAFTA has no provisions on labor rights, politicians and citizens in 
the United States, Mexico, and Canada began to voice their concerns about the trade agreement 
even before it was ratified (Compa 6). For example, during his Presidential run in 1992, Bill 
Clinton stated that NAFTA “did nothing to reaffirm our right to insist that the Mexicans follow 
their own labor standards, now frequently violated” (Human Rights Watch 1). These publicly 
expressed concerns ultimately led to the decision to create the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation (Compa 6). 
 In the United States, many lawmakers expressed that they would refuse to approve the 
congressional-executive agreement unless labor norms were somehow incorporated into the free 
trade agreement (McGuinness 582).  A major reason there was so much support for creating a 
way to implement labor standards was because there was much fear that industries in the United 
States and Canada would simply go to Mexico to exploit “lower production costs and the weak 
labor and occupational health regulatory structure” (McGuinness 580). The idea that American 
and Canadian citizens would lose jobs and Mexican workers may be subjugated to harsh, unfair 
working conditions created a push to ensure that the laborers in all member countries would be in 
no way harmed by the effects of NAFTA. In essence, the NAALC was a mechanism to alleviate 
concerns about NAFTA’s potential consequences (McGuinness 582).   
 Although the NAALC had the intentions of preserving labor rights and enforcing 
domestic laws, we must question whether or not this set-up actually worked. Did the NAALC 
truly make it so corporations could not exploit labor in Mexico? With the constant outrage in the 
US of jobs going to Mexico, it seems that the NAALC has failed. We will continue to explore 
the notion of potential failure in the next sections of this paper.  
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
 In this section of the paper, I will explain what the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation actually is and how it functions. 
The Purpose 
 The main purpose of the NAALC is to have member countries enforce their domestic 
labor standards (Caulfield 66). “The NAALC is supposed to provide ‘a mechanism for member 
countries to ensure the effective enforcement of existing and future domestic labor standards and 
laws without interfering in the sovereign functioning of the different national labor standards’” 
(Caulfield 66). The official text states that the main objective is: 
[T]o improve working conditions and living standards in the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) promotes more trade 
and closer economic ties among the three countries. The preferred approach of the 
Agreement to reach this objective is through cooperation--exchanges of information, 
technical assistance, consultations--a concept that is explicitly recognized in the very title 
of the instrument. The Agreement also provides some oversight mechanisms to ensure 
that labor laws are being enforced in all three countries. These oversight mechanisms are 
aimed at promoting a better understanding by the public of labor laws and at enhancing 
transparency of enforcement. The Agreement does provide the ability to invoke trade 
sanctions as a last resort for non-enforcement of labor law by a Party (“North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation”) 
Essentially, the agreement has two main goals: “(1) to encourage the improvement of labor 
conditions in North America through cooperative activities, including the promotion of a set of 
eleven labor principles… and (2) to provide a mechanism for mediating labor disputes” 
(Caulfield 66). These broad goals are said to be the key reasons the accord was ratified.   
The Function 
In order to understand what the NAALC does, it is important to note what the NAALC 
does not do: “The NAALC does not require the governments of the three signatory countries to 
raise standards to meet existing minimum international labor standards” (Caulfield 66). This 
means that the NAALC does not create any new type of law or regulation. Now that I have 
explained what the NAALC does not do, I will explain what it does establish. 
The agreement states that all member countries will follow six objectives (“The North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). These objectives are: 
a) improve working conditions and living standards in each Party's territory; 
b) promote, to the maximum extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex 11; 
c) encourage cooperation to promote innovation and rising levels of productivity and 
quality; 
                                                        
1  Annex 1: 1) Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 2) The right to bargain collectively, 3) The right to 
strike, 4) Prohibition of forced labor, 5) Labor protections for children and young persons, 6)Minimum employment 
standards, 7)Elimination of employment discrimination, 8) Equal pay for women and men, 9) Prevention of occupational 
injuries and illness, 10) Compensation in cases of occupational injury and illnesses, 11) Protection of migrant workers 
(Compa 1997) 
 
d) encourage publication and exchange of information, data development and coordination, 
and joint studies to enhance mutually beneficial understanding of the laws and 
institutions governing labor in each Party's territory; 
e) pursue cooperative labor-related activities on the basis of mutual benefit; 
f) promote compliance with, and effective enforcement by each Party of, its labor law; and 
g) foster transparency in the administration of labor law. (“The North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation”)  
These six standards are followed by six ways in which the governments can implement the 
standards. This is covered in the “Government Action Section” (“The North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). The Government Enforcement Action section states: 
1. Each Party shall promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law 
through appropriate government action, subject to Article 42, such as 
a. appointing and training inspectors; 
b. monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations, including through 
on-site inspections; 
c. seeking assurances of voluntary compliance; 
d. requiring record keeping and reporting 
e. encouraging the establishment of worker-management committees to address 
labor regulation of the workplace; 
f. providing or encouraging mediation, conciliation and arbitration services; or 
g. initiating, in a timely manner, proceedings to seek appropriate sanction or 
remedies for violations of its labor law. 
2. Each Party shall ensure that its competent authorities give due consideration in 
accordance with its law to any request by an employer, employee or their 
representatives, or other interested person, for an investigation of an alleged violation 
of the Party's labor law. (“The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”) 
These ideals are supposed to be enforced through a body created by the NAALC that is known as 
the Commission for Labor Cooperation (Caulfield 66). It is critical to remember that: 
While the countries have not yielded sovereignty with respect to the content of their laws 
or the authorities and procedure for enforcing them, they have transcended traditional 
notions of sovereignty by opening themselves to critical international and independent 
reviews, evaluations and even arbitrations over their performance in enforcing labor laws 
(Compa 7) 
It is also important to note that only three out of the eleven issue areas that were covered in 
Appendix 1 carry any kind of potential fine or loss in accordance with the NAALC (Compa 7). 
The areas are: minimum wage, child labor, and occupational health and safety (Compa 7). 
Moreover, the fine or loss can only occur if there is a “persistent pattern of failure to effectively 
enforce domestic law (Compa 7). Again, the eleven labor standards are defined as “guiding 
principles” and they in no way “establish common minimum standards for their [the member 
countries] domestic law” (“ The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). 
Enforcement Mechanisms 
The NAALC aims to ensure each country is complying with and enforcing their labor 
laws without yielding sovereignty (Compa 7). So, how exactly does the NAALC go about 
ensuring this objective?  The NAALC “establishes a tri-national dispute resolution scheme 
seeking specifically to respond to differences in labor regulation throughout North America” 
(1994). Additionally, there are two mandatory structures (“The North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation”). These structures are the Commission for Labor Cooperation, which is 
made up of a Ministerial Council and a Secretariat, and National Administrative Offices (NAOs) 
in each member county: the structure allows for oversight and enforcement if a member country 
is noncompliant with the rules of the NAALC (“The North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation”). As stated by the United States Department of Labor: 
The Agreement creates both international and domestic institutions. The international 
institution is the Commission for Labor Cooperation, consisting of a Council supported 
by a Secretariat. The domestic institutions are the National Administrative Offices 
(NAOs), located in each of the countries, and national or governmental advisory 
committees (“The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”) 
 The first of these components is the “cabinet- level Ministerial Council and a permanent 
staff Secretariat [which] make up the Commission for Labor Cooperation” (Compa 7). The 
Council is made up of the United States Secretary of Labor, the Mexican Secretary of Labor and 
the Canadian Minister of Labor (Compa 7). The purpose of the Council is to ensure the 
compliance of the NAALC and work as a single entity to ensure the enforcement of the NAALC 
(Compa 7).  
Additionally, the Council oversees the independent Secretariat, whom has an office 
located in Dallas, Texas and has a small staff of fifteen members (Compa 7). The two main 
functions of the Secretariat are creating reports on the labor laws and labor markets of the three 
countries and acting as a “general administrative arm” “providing staff support to the Council 
and to any Evaluation Committees of Experts or Arbitral Panels established under the 
Agreement” (Compa 9).  
 The other mandatory structure the NAALC provides is the National Administrative 
Offices (NAOs) within each member country’s Labor Department (Compa 9). The basic function 
of the NAO offices is to “serve as a points of contact and sources information among themselves 
and government agencies, with the Dallas-based Secretariat, and with the public” (Compa 9). 
Furthermore, the NAOs are the bodies that receive labor complaints that occur in fellow NAFTA 
countries (Compa 9).  
Workers, unions and allies of these groups who have complaints must file these 
complaints with the NAO in any country other then their own in order to begin the review 
process of their case (Compa 10). If there is a case that involves one or more of the eleven 
standards that have been agreed to by each country then the NAO may recommend “ministerial 
consultations at the Council level as part of its  ‘report for review’…. The consultations can be 
bi-lateral… or tri-lateral” (Compa 10). 
 After consultations occur (if they occur at all), any Party, meaning member country, 
involved in the dispute is allowed to request the establishment an independent Evaluation 
Committee of Experts (ECE). This may be requested if any of the labor principles are involved, 
with the exception of principles 1, 2 or 3 (Compa 10). Although an ECE can be established due 
to a complaint, a minister is able to request an ECE without any such formal complaint being 
present.  
 If a Party requested an ECE report and after the report has been commissioned said Party 
is still not satisfied then they are able to request an independent Arbitral Panel (Compa 10-11). 
This panel has the authority to rule on the issue and offer an “action plan” to the parties in 
conflict (Compa 10). If the action plan is not implemented then the Arbitral Panel has the 
authority to “impose a monetary enforcement assessment against the offending government” 
(Compa 11). If the fine is not paid by the offending government then there is the potential for 
trade sanctions to be applied to the incompliant country” (Compa 11). 
Overall, the structure provides for a “four-level dispute resolution process to promote 
compliance with national labor law” (Caulfield 66). The dispute process consists of: “(1) NAO 
review and consultations, (2) ministerial consultations, (3) evaluation by a committee of experts, 
and (4) review by a dispute-resolution panel” formally called an Arbitral Panel (Caulfield 66). 
However, of the thirty-nine cases that have ever been brought to the NAO’s for review none 
have ever made it past the ministerial consultation phase (“Submissions under the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). 
 Now that I have explained the framework of the NAALC and the structure for 
implementing and overseeing the rules laid out in the NAALC, it should be clear that getting 
cases reviewed is a tedious and arduous process with no guarantee of any remedy. However, if 
we accept that the reason for creating the NAALC was to improve labor standards and create a 
path to reconcile any grievances, then we can not just look at the structures laid out in the text of 
the agreement: we must also decide how effective these structures have been in providing the 
services that they said they would and if the member countries and corporations are actually 
being held to the standards laid out in the agreement.  
 In the next section of the paper, I will be reviewing literature on the topic of the NAALC 
to further expand on my research.  
Literature Review 
In this section, I will provide additional academic sources that have focused on the 
effectiveness and reality of the NAALC. 
A handful of studies looking into the NAALC have shown that Mexico’s domestic labor 
standards are not being complied with under the NAALC (Englehart 386). For example, a report 
conducted by the Human Rights Watch that aimed to evaluate the accord and gauge how 
compliant the countries have been in respect to the NAALC, found many structural problems 
that the member countries have refused to resolve (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights 
Cases”). The report states, “little has been done… to overcome structural problems found in [the] 
enforcement mechanisms [of the NAALC]” (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). The 
report also notes, “although the side agreement does not require outside complaints to spur 
governmental action on non-compliance with NAALC obligations, to date no country has 
independently initiated consultations regarding possible violations of the NAALC” (“The Results 
of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). The fact that no country has pursued any type of investigation 
implies a lack of will power by the Party countries to adhere to the standards of the NAALC 
(“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). Moreover, the NAOs have openly admitted that 
there are structural problems within the NAALC because they have held training and seminars to 
discuss the structural weaknesses (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). However, 
these trainings and seminars have not created any changes to the enforcement mechanism 
processes in which many submitters have taken issue with and believe that the poor structuring 
of the NAALC has resulted in unfair results in the cases that have been filed (“The Results of 
NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”). 
It is interesting that there has been so many complaints about the Mexican government’s 
non-compliance when, on paper, Mexican labor laws are quite strong (McGuinness 16).  In fact, 
Article 123 of the Mexican constitution creates rigid standards in which employers are supposed 
to abide by (McGuinness 6). For examples, some of the fundamental labor standards included in 
the Constitution are “standards controlling the work day, [standards regulating] working 
conditions and the Mexican laborer’s right to organize” (McGuiness 6-7). While the standards 
may seem strong, unfortunately, they continue to go unenforced (McGuinness 16-18)  
A reason for the lack of enforcement may be due to a theory called Social Dumping 
(McGuinness 1) In the article, “The Politics of Labor Regulation in North America: A 
Reconsideration of Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico,” Michael McGuiness introduces the 
theory of Social Dumping and explains the ramifications of the phenomenon. First, the theory is 
rooted in three major arguments: First, that Mexico’s labor structure is disorganized and hence 
the workforce suffers from this disorganization, second, due to weak regulations in Mexico, the 
United States and Canada will take advantage of the poorly regulated Mexican workforce and 
third, the Mexican workforce will be exploited in terms of workplace safety and health 
conditions due to US and Canadian corporate interests (McGuinness 4; Alexander and Labotz; 
Kay 429). He attributes these three reasons to why the Mexican government continues to poorly 
enforce their own laws (McGuinness 4).  
 Furthermore, in the article, authored in 1996, titled, “Downward Mobility Mexican 
Workers After NAFTA,” author Carlos Heredia expresses his distaste with NAFTA. He 
expresses the sentiment that NAFTA was “designed to facilitate investment and capital flows 
into the regions, and to maintain a pool of cheap and available labor” (Heredia). The “cheap and 
available labor” has led to continuous complaints against the Mexican government, but often 
times, the complaints go unresolved (“The Results of NAFTA Labor Rights Cases”; Heredia). 
Moreover, he states, “in both countries [the United States and Mexico], only big capitalists have 
benefited from NAFTA (Heredia). While he remains adamant that the working conditions in 
Mexico are not up to standard, he does believe that three things could help fix the unfavorable 
conditions. The three things are: democratization of labor unions, political alliances between 
unions and other organized sectors of the population and leadership that looks beyond 
geographical borders” (Heredia).  
While it seems heavily agreed upon that there are not enough stringent enforcement 
mechanisms to adequately protect Mexican laborers, there are some ways in which the NAALC 
has tried to establish standards to hold countries and corporations accountable. The Agreement 
established the National Administrative Office within each of the member country’s labor 
department. Additionally, the Agreement created the North American Commission for Labor 
Standards, which is “headed by a Ministerial Counsel comprised of the three parties’ labor 
secretaries to coordinate the implementation of the agreement (Jacobs 130). However, even with 
these mechanisms to help regulate abuses, there are still widespread problems and flaws that 
need to be worked out in order to successfully achieve the objectives of the NAALC (Jacobs 
2010). One of the main reasons for all the problems, in regards to the structures created by the 
NAALC, is that there are ever hardly any cases that go to the NAO. In the first twelve years of 
NAFTA, only thirty-four complaints were ever filed and of the complaints, none have made it 
past the consultation phase (Jacobs 131-132). Jacobs seems to believe that the reason for the lack 
of prosecution is due to the Ministers’ unwillingness to pursue arbitration (Jacobs 136). Overall, 
there seems to be many studies and observations that prove there are fundamental flaws in the 
NAALC. 
 With this analysis we must question why ministers are unwilling to enforce labor 
standards and what would push ministers to decide they will begin enforcing standards. Further, 
we must evaluate what the NAALC is doing and if what it is currently doing is effective in 
protecting laborers. In the next section of this paper, I will explain the reality of the NAALC and 
delve deeper into why this accord has been deemed as ineffective.  
The Reality: Why the NAALC is Not Effective 
 In this section, I will explain how structural weakness of the NAALC and how the efforts 
to enforce the NAALC are inadequate.  
Structural Weakness 
A) Enforcement Mechanisms  
As stated previously, the NAALC does not establish any new labor standards for the 
member countries to comply with (Compa 7). Its’ most fundamental goal is to have member 
countries, the United Stated, Canada and Mexico, comply with their own domestic labor 
standards (Compa 7). Author, Frederick Englehart, perfectly explains what the purpose of the 
NAALC is in a piece he published titled, "Withered Giants: Mexican And U.S. Organized Labor 
And The North American Agreement On Labor." Englehart explains: 
Oversight mechanisms [drafted in the NAALC] are aimed at enhancing the public’s 
understanding of labor law and transparency or enforcement rather than punishment 
through trade sanctions. Sanctions exist, but are contemplated to be applied only upon the 
failure of cooperation and consultation, expert evaluation, negotiation, and arbitration 
(351) 
This leads to the conclusion that the different oversight bodies were structured more for the 
public image of the NAALC, as opposed to a body that could actually directly impact labor law 
and protect workers.  
 While transparency is beneficial to creating success in championing fair labor practices, 
due to the nature of the NAALC, many critics are upset by the totality of the agreement. In his 
work, “The Limits of Regionalism: NAFTA’s Labour Accord,” Robert Finbow explains how 
skeptics of the NAALC continue to feel about the accord. He states, “critics were generally 
dismissive of the NAALC’s potential, and viewed it cynically as a paper tiger designed to 
assuage political pressures rather than encourage effective enforcement of labour laws and 
rights” (Finbow 4). Most critics agree that“ the labour accord is a weak vehicle designed ‘to 
publicly denounce the violation of labor laws [and] to sensitize public opinion regarding these 
violations and their impact’, with insufficient enforcement power” (Finbow 4). 
 The insufficient enforcement power is most obviously seen in the fact that a state can 
only face sanctions, the most severe repercussion for breaking the accord, for violating labor 
principles 5, 6 and 9. (Bieszczat 1393) “The glaring omission is the failure to provide sanctions 
for violations of the right to organize and bargain collectively” (Bieszczat 1393-1394). Out of the 
eleven labor principles that were agreed upon by each of the member countries only three hold 
any significant power. It must be noted that sanctions have thus far never been used in any of the 
thirty-nine cases that have gone to the NAOs for review (“Submissions under the NAALC”).    
 The most prominent enforcement mechanism used so far has been ministerial 
consultations (Bieszczat 1394). However, not much is ever accomplished by these ministerial 
consultations and there is never a direct remedy for the workers who had their rights violated in 
accordance with the labor principles that were agreed upon in the NAALC (Bieszczat 1394). 
Typically, after wrongdoing is found the Council will, more likely than not, create training 
sessions for government officials or establish a new type of committee (Bieszczat 1394). “This 
result leads to petitioner frustration, as even a successful petition accomplishes nothing more 
than what is perceived as a public relations move by the party governments” (Bieszczat 1394). 
  
Since workers realize that filing a petition has not ever led to a clear remedy for them and “given  
the resources necessary to achieve this toothless result, petitioners are disincentivized from 
utilizing the NAALC petition process” (Bieszczat 1394). This may explain why only thirty-nine 
cases have ever been submitted for review.  
  The reality of the NAALC is that it has no real power to remedy workers. Workers, now 
seeing what has occurred when submitting a successful petition, feel disenfranchised because 
they know the NAALC process will not help them in their fight for justice (Bieszczat 1349). 
Furthermore, of the thirty-nine cases that have been submitted, only twenty-two have been 
accepted for review and of those twenty-two cases the NAOs only recommended ministerial 
consultations in fourteen of those cases: refer to figure 1 for a breakdown of the cases. This is 
troubling information given that the main objective of the NAALC, bettering working conditions 
in North America, is not being met for workers in Mexico. 
This analysis leads to the argument that the structures set up under the NAALC do not 
have any real enforcement mechanism (Jacobs 139-140). As author Cody Jacobs states in his 
article “Trade We Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor Provisions To Create More 
Figure 1: Data used from the United States Department of Labor 
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Equitable Growth In North America,” “the highest level of enforcement available under the 
NAALC [are] ministerial consultations” and even when these consultations have found 
wrongdoing on the part of corporations “none of the wrongly fired laborers were compensated or 
reinstated and none of the companies faced any consequences” (Jacobs 136). These early cases 
quickly reinforced the image of the NAALC among labor unions and activists as ‘more of a 
meeting place than a true enforcement mechanism’” (Jacobs 136). 
It would seem then that since there was open discussion about the wrongdoings that were 
being committed in violation of the NAALC, member countries would want to see repercussion 
for the incompliance. However, this is not the case. Instead, it was openly acknowledged that the 
NAALC was not creating legitimate enforcements, but member countries were okay with this 
fact: “the Clinton administration argued that [the] NAALC strengthened awareness of core 
rights” (Finbow 88). The “awareness,” however, never seemed to translate into any feasible 
action. The lack of any “concrete results” has led an overwhelming amount of negative criticism 
and has made the majority opinion of the NAALC remarkably negative (Bieszczat 1393).  
B) Non-interference by Other Countries 
Finally, to make it clear that there will be no labor interference amongst the other 
member countries, no matter what the issue, Article 52 Part Six was agreed upon and is written 
in the NAALC. Part Six under Article 52 of the NAALC it states “Nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake labor law enforcement activities 
in the territory of another Party” (Government of Canada 2013). Essentially, Article 52 makes it 
evident that no member country can, in any way, act on behalf of another country in an effort to 
ensure labor standards are enforced in another country’s territory. 
This part of the agreement was most likely written in the manner it was due to Mexico’s 
strong stance on enforcing their labor laws without interference (or repercussion) from other 
countries (Guerra Torriente 503-504). Before the NAALC negotiations even started, Mexico was 
adamant about ensuring autonomy and sovereignty in its’ territory when entering an agreement 
with the US and Canada (Guerra and Torriente 504).  
During the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico opposed the notion of permitting the NAALC 
Commission to intervene into the area of Mexico’s enforcement of its own labor laws, 
particularly those laws regulating collective bargaining. Mexico argued that such 
intervention could result in interference with and violation of Mexico’s territorial 
sovereignty. Mexico took the position that permitting such interference was inappropriate 
in the context of a commercial treaty. The U.S. Nevertheless insisted that the NAALC be 
drafted (Guerra and Torriente 504) 
Knowing that the Mexican government had strong views on overseeing their labor law, it is a 
wonder why the U.S and Canada went forward with the NAALC. Especially, when the U.S. 
always was open with the fact that the Mexican government was not good at enforcing their 
domestic labor laws (Guerra and Torriente 504). It is evident that critics are right in saying, “the 
NAALC… is… little more than a statement of good intentions [and] suffers from lack of clarity 
and lack of an efficient mechanism for achieving its goals, with the enforcement of most of its 
provisions left to the discretion of each of the NAFTA parties” (Guerra and Torriente 504).  
To conclude the section, I want to emphasize that I understand the importance of 
protecting a country’s sovereignty. However, human rights abuses, especially in the context of 
NAFTA, should be subject to scrutiny on an international level. While it is important to ensure 
that each country is able to be autonomous and act in a way that best serves their population, we 
must remember that NAFTA is an international trade agreement and the NAALC is a means to 
ensure labor standards across the member countries. The structural weakness of the NAALC has 
rendered it ineffective and completely incapable of achieving it’s mission of enhancing labor 
standards across North America.  
Monitoring Labor Standards 
 Monitoring labor standards is a critical aspect to enforcing labor law. Without any sort of 
enforcement mechanism, laborers are unable to voice complaints and abuses continue to persist. 
Mexico’s case, however, is quite interesting. “On paper, Mexican workers’ rights appear 
enviable…. ‘Mexican people live and work under and astounding collection of protective labor 
statutes, policies and practices which provide them, as employees, with an extensive list of 
detailed rights and privileges’” (Finbow 55). In fact, the Mexican Constitution, in Article 123, 
“establishes a number of fundamental labor standards in order to ensure dignified work for 
Mexican laborers, including standards controlling the work day, working conditions and the 
Mexican laborer’s right to organize” (McGuinness 6-7). While the paper trail looks good for 
Mexico and their laborers, the reality is much different.  
There is an excess of incompliance and loopholes that allow Mexican labor standards to 
fall short in comparison with the United States and Canada. One study, which was conducted 
from the Human Rights Watch, points out that labor inspectors simply seem unwilling to 
investigate claims of labor discrimination (in this case specifically, claims of gender 
discrimination) or they lack knowledge to conduct an effective investigation (McGuinness 17-
18). Others who have investigated the issue have attributed it to the corruption and 
disorganization within the inspection system (McGuinness 19). Further, there are accounts that 
simply place the blame on the lack of political will amongst the labor administrator’s in Mexico: 
they do not effectively enforce or regulate compliance with the country’s labor standards 
(McGuinness 2014). Lastly, there is some consensus that Mexico has adopted a “hands off 
approach to labor law enforcement…. [because] the Mexican government is more interested in 
attracting and appeasing foreign investors than in aggressively protecting the rights of Mexican 
Workers” (McGuinness 18). 
 Due to the lack of resources and lack of will on the part of the Mexican government, 
labor standards continue to go unenforced. It was thought that the NAALC’s dispute-resolution 
process would remedy the lack of compliance with domestic labor standards in Mexico, but it 
has been discovered by multiple researchers that this is not the case.  Instead, noncompliance 
continues to go unpunished and workers face grave injustice. Now that I have explained the 
structural weakness of the NAALC and the problematic nature of labor standards being 
monitored, I will now move on to the data and methods I use for the purposes of my research. 
Data and Methods 
In this section of the paper, I will explain the data and methods I have chosen to use in 
order to assess and analyze the topic. 
 I have approached this topic by using the case study method. I have chosen two cases, 
USNAO 19004 and USNAO 2000-02, in order to prove my thesis statement: the NAALC has 
not adequately protected laborers in Mexico. While there are thirty-nine different cases to look at 
regarding NAALC submissions, the two cases I chose adequately represents the common trend 
amongst all the cases. These two cases reflect the broader pattern that cases, which go through 
the dispute-resolution process of the NAALC, do not result in substantive resolution for laborers 
in Mexico. Nor do they create compliance with labor provisions by the Mexican government. 
 The case study method was the most appropriate choice for this paper because it allows 
me to demonstrate, clearly, all the details that go into deciding a case and then look at the remedy 
provided by either the NAOs or the Council. I can evaluate how the NAOs decide to evaluate a 
case, whether their evaluation is just and if the remedy provided is substantive and adheres to the 
main objective of the NAALC- to create better working conditions across all of North America.   
 In the next section of this paper, I will describe, in depth, two cases that have gone 
through the NAALC dispute-resolution process.   
Case Studies 
 In this section of the paper, I will look at two separate case studies in order to 
demonstrate the lack of remedy provided by the NAALC. 
General Background on Cases 
The National Administrative Office’s are generally in charge of providing remedies for cases 
involving labor standard violations (McGuinness 584). It is through the NAO’s that laborers who 
believe they have legitimate claims can seek redress and file their complaints. The NAO’s, on 
paper, are supposed to be protecting laborers by ensuring member countries are monitoring and 
complying with labor standards throughout their country. However, when looking at the way in 
which NAO’s have dealt with claims, it seems that there has been no real remedies for laborers 
who have filed claims (Jacobs 136). 
I have derived this assertion through a multitude of sources. To start, in the article "Trade We 
Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor Provisions To Create More Equitable Growth In 
North America," author Cody Jacobs states “in the first 12 years of NAFTA’s existence, only 34 
complaints were ever filed with the NAO. Of those complaints, none have ever gone past the 
consultation phase and the majority were either dismissed or withdrawn at the national level” 
(Jacobs 136). At first reading, it may seem that these complaints were simply remedied at the 
ministerial consultation level, but as Jacobs further explains, “labor ministers’ reluctance 
[emphasis mine] to pursue arbitration (or even convene an ECE), is a reflection of their role as 
political appointees and representatives of their governments, rather than as impartial enforcers 
of the agreement” (Jacobs 136). This leads Jacobs to the ultimate claim that “[w]ith the dispute 
resolution process of the NAALC largely ineffective, Mexican authorities continue to laxly 
enforce their own labor laws, particularly in the area of free association, to the direct detriment of 
Mexican workers and the indirect detriment of U.S and Canadian workers facing unfair 
competition (136). The unfair nature of enforcement from the NAO’s and the Mexican 
government has made it difficult for Mexican workers to actually voice complaints.  
USNAO 94001- Honeywell Corporations   
 Honeywell Manufacturas de Chihuahua, S.A is a manufacturing plant that specializes in 
producing electronics equipment in the city Chihuahua, Mexico (USNAO Submission #94001 
and #94002 2). At the time of the allegations, the plant employed approximately 480 workers 
(NAO Submission #94001 and #94002 2). The NAO accepted the case for review on April 15, 
1994 (United States Department of Labor).  
 The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) filed a case against Honeywell 
Corporation through the U.S. NAO. The allegations of the case were that Honeywell was not 
allowing workers to join unions of their choice and, consequently, firing and threatening workers 
who showed interest in unionizing (Caulfield 72; Compa 14). Workers at Honeywell were paid, 
what is equivalent to, forty-five U.S. dollars a week. IBT asserted that these wages were 
“exceptionally low” and in order for the corporation to keep them this low “Honeywell ha[d] 
used illegal threats and firings to keep its employees from joining a union” (NAO Submission 
#94001 and #94002 2-3). The allegers stated that the Mexican government was in violation of 
labor principle 1 of the NAALC and, additionally, was in violation of Article 123 of the Mexican 
Constitution; they did not adequately protect Mexican workers right to organize (Compa 14). 
The specifics of the case are that on November 12, 1993, an officer of the union Sindicato 
de Trabajadores de la Industría Metálica, Acero, Hierro, Conexos y Similares (STIMAHCS), 
which is part of an independent labor organization, Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), hosted a 
meeting that twelve Honeywell workers attended (NAO Submission #94001 and #94002 3). 
After this meeting, in late November, Honeywell “fired approximately 20 production workers, 
nearly all of whom expressed an interest in joining an independent union” (USNAO Submission 
#94001 and #94002 3). Furthermore, the allegers state that the workers who were being fired 
were told that their termination was a result of their union interests and that they had to sign 
resignation forms in order to receive their severance (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 
3). Additionally, the submission details that one of the workers who was fired by Honeywell 
filed a complaint before a Mexican Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB), which was 
pending, during the time the submission to the U.S. NAO (USNAO Submission #94001 and 
#94002 3). It should be noted that, “CABs have a reputation for refusing to reinstate workers 
fired for supporting independent unions like the FAT” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 
3).  
The US NAO accepted the case for review and held a public hearing to review the facts 
of the case on September 12, 1994 (Compa 14).  Workers from the plant, Mexican labor lawyers 
and US union representatives testified, however, no one representing the Honeywell Corporation 
came to give a statement (Compa 14). Lawyers who were representing the submitters asked for 
several recommendations (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 19). These 
recommendations included:  
[R]equiring the two companies involved [Honeywell and General Electric] in the 
submission to reinstate workers, … asking companies to adhere to a code of conduct on 
worker rights for their operation in the maquiladora sector…. And recommended 
sustained consultations among the NAOs to develop cooperative activities on 
associational and organizing rights (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 19) 
 After the testimony was given, the Pubic Report of Review was issued on October 12, 
1994 (United States Department of Labor). The final consensus of the NAO was that they were 
“not in a position to make a finding that the government of Mexico failed to enforce the relevant 
labor laws” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 30). The reason for this decision was 
because the Mexican workers that were fired took a severance package, henceforth, “preempting 
Mexican authorities from establishing whether the dismissals were for cause or in retribution for 
union organizing” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 30). However, the NAO 
acknowledges that most workers face economic hardship and therefore had to take the severance 
deal as opposed to getting their case reviewed by the Mexican Conciliation and Arbitration 
Board (CAB): “since workers for personal financial reasons accepted severance” they could not 
hold the Mexican government accountable for not taking action (USNAO Submission #94001 
and #94002 29-30).  
It seems counterintuitive then to assert that most worked had to take the severance 
package due to the economic hardship they faced, yet still render a decisions that would not 
provide remedy to workers who face these situations. It should also be noted that the NAO stated 
the purpose of the review “had not been aimed primarily at whether or not the two companies 
named in submission acted in violation of Mexican labor law” (USNAO Submission #94001 and 
#94002 19). The point of the NAALC is to ensure each government in complying with their 
domestic laws, but one of the main objectives is to better working standards across North 
America- in this case, it seems these two ideals conflicted.  
 While the NAO chose not to hold a ministerial consultation, which could have led to 
finding the government responsible for the firings, the NAO did state that it “shares the 
submitters’ concerns about the vital importance of freedom of association and right to organize 
and the implications for workers of the failures of the governments to protect such rights” 
(USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 32). Due to the NAO’s concerns they ultimately 
recommended several “cooperative activities” on the “issues of freedom of association and the 
right to organize”; these cooperative activities should include public education programs 
regarding the NAAALC (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 32-33). The member 
countries agreed to the recommendation and in 1996 held a conference in Canada where they 
discussed the issues of freedom of association, the right to organize and employment structures 
(Compa 15).  
 While the process of the NAOs aims to achieve the objective of “improving labor 
standards across North America,” it is important to remember that the NAOs only look at 
government enforcement and not how corporations are treating employees (“The North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation). The NAO asserts this fact in their Report of 
Review by saying: 
[T]he NAO review has not been aimed primarily at determining whether or not the two 
companies named in the submissions may be in violation of Mexican labor law. 
Moreover, the NAO is not an appellate body nor is it a substitute for pursuing domestic 
remedies. Rather, the purpose of the NAO review process, including the public hearing, 
is to gather as much information as possible to allow the NAO to better understand and 
publicly report on the Government of Mexico’s promotion of compliance with, and 
effective enforcement of, its labor law through appropriate government action, as set out 
in Article 3 of the NAALC (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 28) 
The NAO essentially found that workers had had their rights violated, however, due to the nature 
of the NAALC there was no way to hold the corporation accountable for these violations.  
USNAO 2000-01- Auto Trim and Custom Trim 
 Auto Trim of Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Custom Breed of Valle Hermoso, Tamaulipas 
are maquiladora plants that specialize in manufacturing steering wheels and gearshifts (USNAO 
Submission #2000-01 9). The submission was filed by the Coalition for Justice in the 
Maquiladoras, twenty-two other unions and nongovernmental organization and several workers 
from Auto Trim and Custom Trim (“Submissions under the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation”). The submission was filed on July 3, 2000 and the US NAO published a 
Public Report of Review issued on April 6, 2001 (“Submissions under the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). In the NAOs report, ministerial-level consultations were 
recommended (“Submissions under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”).  
 The allegations of the case were that workers in these two plants had health and safety 
concerns due to exposure to toxic substances and muscular-skeletal disorders caused by 
“ergonomically unsound practices” (USNAO Submission #2000-01 9). Additionally, workers 
urged that problems stemmed from: 
[F]ailure to provide information and training about occupational hazards, pressure on 
workers to meet excessively high production quotas, poorly designed work stations, 
inadequate personal protective equipment, lack of properly functioning safety and health 
committees, failure to stock medical supplies on-site, failure to institute workplace 
monitoring, and substandard ventilation. The submitters also maintain that occupational 
illnesses and injuries are often unreported or under-reported and that workers are 
inadequately treated and compensated (USNAO Submission #2000-01 9) 
The multitude of problems that went unresolved led to the submission of the case to the NAALC 
in order for workers to remedy the problems that occurred at these two plants. 
Moreover, the submitters insist that these violations that had been occurring were due to 
the “inadequate enforcement on the part of the Mexican government, namely the failure to 
conduct inspections and impose sanctions or fines” (USNAO Submission #2000-01 9). The 
workers detail that they filed multiple submissions to the Mexican government (before filing the 
NAALC submission) in order to remedy the violations occurring at their place of work (USNAO 
Submission #2000-01 9-10). For example, In April 1999 workers, who had already filed for a 
petition to the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) but did not receive any help, filed 
another submission to the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) and the Secretariat of Health 
(SSA) to conduct inspections. However, the workers never believed any such inspection took 
place even though the SSA, after further insistence from the workers, told them they would 
conduct inspections (USNAO Submission #2000-01 5).  
Due to the continued lack of enforcement by the government, the submitters argued that 
the government of Mexico violated the NAALC: specifically, provisions in articles 1, 3, 4, 5 and 
7 (USNAO Submission #2000-01 10). Additionally, the government failed to enforce the 
Mexican Constitution and various national laws, standards and regulations (USNAO Submission 
#2000-01 10). Due to the nature of the violations, the submitters of the petition asked for several 
remedies. 
The submitters requested several actions from the US NAO. The key actions they 
requested were: investigating and examining the health violations that were occurring at Auto 
Trim and Custom Trim, compelling the Mexican government to comply with the health and 
safety standards that are established the Mexican constitution and established laws and to 
determine the “required fines and penalties for each health and safety violation at Auto Trim and 
Custom Trim/ Breed Mexicana according to the conclusions of the fact-finding commission” 
(USNAO Submission #2000-01 10).  
The NAO did investigate the complaints and issue the findings of their inspection in their 
Public Report of Review. The US NAO found that the government has taken “remedial 
measures” to conduct health and safety reviews (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). However, 
while the US NAO made the assertion that the Mexican government did complete inspections to 
varying degrees, they also found that “the efficacy of these processes [was] problematic” 
(USNAO Submission #2000-01 55).  The problematic nature of the Mexican government’s 
inspections can be seen in three key areas. The first is that the inspection reports give personal 
details about workers  (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). The lack of confidentiality in the 
reports likely led to workers not feeling secure in voicing the real problems they were having at 
their workplace in fear of facing repercussions from their company (USNAO Submission #2000-
01 55). Second, the inspectors used a checklist when conducting their report. So, instead of 
testing and ensuring compliance with what was on the list, they only noted the existence of 
workplace systems and documents (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55).  This led inspectors to 
carelessly give inspections and made it highly likely for inspectors to not look into violations that 
were occurring at these two plants. Lastly, “the procedures for certifying third party monitors, 
which are relied on by employers and the governmental authorities [were] not clear” (USNAO 
Submission #2000-01 55). With procedures not being clear, there were likely many discrepancies 
in the ways in which the different inspectors were conducting their inspections.  
Overall, the USNAO stated that they were recommending this case for ministerial 
consultation because the Mexican government failed to communicate with workers about the 
efforts the government was making in response to petitions that workers had previously filed and 
the lack of record keeping on the part of the government documenting the efforts the government 
was, supposedly, making (USNAO Submission #2000-01 55). Additionally, the US NAO asked 
the petitioners to draft a set of recommendations for the Ministerial Council to look over 
(Shurtman 326). The highest prioritized recommendations on the submitters list were the 
demands for the IMSS and STPS (Shurtman 327-328). They asked the IMSS to re-evaluate the 
cases of workers who were denied unemployment-related compensation pay or who claimed to 
be under-paid by the company (Shurtman 327). Furthermore they wanted the IMSS to “establish 
public, transparent criteria” for evaluations done by medical doctor on workers who claim they 
were injured or fell ill due the workplace, award compensation to these workers and ensure that 
workers who were being evaluated by the IMSS be given written notice of why the IMSS 
decided to award or deny compensation (Shurtman 327). They also recommended STPS 
(Secretary of Labor and Social Security) re-inspect the plant, continue monitoring on a regular 
schedule, issue the corrective measure to the employer and impose sanctions if the violations 
persist at the plants (Shurtman 328).  They also stated in the closing of their letter, “the U.S. and 
Mexican governments must establish a reasonable timetable for the conduct of ministerial 
consultations and implementation of the submitters’ recommendations” (Shurtman 328-329). 
Submitters had much trouble during the NAALC process getting information from the NAOs 
and were left wondering when reviews would be held (Shurtman 326). The untimeliness of the 
process led submitters to emphasize the NAALC resolution-dispute process needed to be 
conducted in a more efficient manner so workers could be remedied as soon as possible (328).  
On June 11, 2002 a Joint Ministerial Declaration was signed by the US and Mexican 
Labor Secretaries (Shurtman 332). The Ministerial Declaration declared that the problems that 
were raised in the submission would be resolved by establishing an “intergovernmental Working 
Group to further study the issues” (Shurtman 332). Unfortunately, the Joint Declaration “neither 
adopted any of the submitters’ proposals, nor referred to one of the workers’ primary concerns: 
the failure of the IMSS to comply with its own laws, regulations, and norms regarding treatment 
and compensation for work-related injuries and illness” (Shurtman 332).  
The requests made by the submitters and the action taken by the Ministerial Council 
clearly does not match. After five years of time and energy put into this case the remedy that was 
given has achieved nothing for the workers: “ No evidence exists that their [the submitters] 
efforts achieved measureable gains in the enforcement of occupational health and safety laws at 
other maquiladoras” (Shurtman 338). The realization that nothing was gained for the workers 
after going through the arduous NAALC resolution-dispute process has led to many frustrations 
and concerns by experts and workers alike. As Garrett Brown, an occupational health and safety 
expert and coordinator or the Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network states: 
If after dotting ever ‘i’ and crossing every ‘t’, these Mexican workers, who have 
suffered serious health problems due to conditions at their plants, can’t get the 
company or the Mexican and U.S. governments to correct the serious health and 
safety hazards documented by the U.S. Labor Department and U.S. NIOSH 
investigations, what does this mean for the enforcement of labor rights under 
NAFTA (Shurtman 338) 
The lack of remedy that comes from even “successful” cases may be the reason that in the past 
twenty-three years, the total lifetime of the NAALC, only thirty-nine cases have been submitted. 
However, even after the less than ideal remedy provided by the Ministerial Council, the 
submitters of the original case have continued to “press for a more concrete resolution of the 
case” (Shurtman 294).  
The workers have expressed their distaste for the “intergovernmental Working Group” 
that was created by calling the Joint Declaration “all talk and no action” (Finbow 127; Shurtman 
294). The submitters have done far more than just voice complaints about the remedy given by 
the Ministerial Council. Additionally, the workers have tried and communicate with the labor 
ministers about their concerns and have made it known they would like to be apart of the remedy 
process (Shurtman 294). For example, the workers recommended member countries “enhance 
enforcement of existing occupational healthy and safety laws,” but the NAALC never responded 
to their suggestion (Shurtman 294). Additionally, the workers and the NGOs that participated in 
the petition asked the labor ministers if they could take part in the “intergovernmental 
discussions” in respect to the Auto Trim case: this request was denied (Shurtman 294).  Now that 
I have detailed two cases, USNOA 94001 and USNAO 2000-01, I will explain my findings and 
give recommendations on the matter.   
Findings  
 In this section of the paper, I will explain the findings I discovered in the case studies in 
which I detailed in the previous section. 
After reviewing the two cases, USNAO 19004 and USNAO 2000-01, it seems that there 
are several problems with the dispute resolution process that is set up in the NAALC. To start, 
the NAALC determines whether or not it will review a case. If an NAO feels that the submission 
filed would not “meet the objectives” of the NAALC than it will decline to review the case 
(“Submissions under the NAALC”).  However, if one of the main objectives of the NAALC is to 
“encourage the improvement of labor standards across North America” than it naturally follows 
that a submission alleging labor violations should at least have an investigation conducted and a 
report issued by one of the NAOs (Caulfield 66).   
Moreover, I found that even when the NAOs find wrongdoing or imply they have found 
wrongdoing, they do not necessarily remedy the wrongdoing. For example, in both the 
Honeywell and Auto Trim cases, the US NAO believed the submitters had legitimate claims and 
violations had occurred (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 32; USNAO Submission 
#2001-01 6). However, even though the NAALC acknowledged the violations, they did not do 
anything to directly remedy the workers; even though in both cases workers asked for direct 
remedies (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 33; USNAO Submission #2001-01 55). This 
is most likely due to states unwillingness to enforce their labor law (Bieszczat 1404). Due to 
their unwillingness to act it seems “nearly impossible that the NAALC’s goals will be achieved 
through a process that relied upon state action” (Bieszczat 1404).  
 However, the most problematic finding in the cases were that even when a ministerial 
consultation occurred, workers still are not remedied for the injustice that has occurred. Having 
the NAO grant a ministerial consultation is thought to be a “success” in terms of the NAALC 
dispute-resolution process. However, even when a case is “successful” this does not guarantee 
workers involved in the case will receive any remedy. Without the NAALC’s ability to monitor 
corporate practices, it seems that laws, regulations and standards will continue to be under- 
enforced and in many cases simply unenforced.  
Recommendations  
In this section of the paper, I will provide three recommendations for strengthening the 
NAALC. 
Independent Oversight Body 
Currently, the Ministerial Council, which ultimately ensures compliance with the 
NAALC, is made up of the Mexican and US Secretary of Labor and the Canadian Minister of 
Labor (Compa 9). This means that the head of labor for each government is monitoring how their 
country’s government in complying with the NAALC. While it may seem fitting that the 
Secretaries/ Minister of Labor would oversee the labor accord, there seems to be a reluctance to 
actually enforce the agreement (Bieszczat 1403, Human Rights Watch 6) 
The reason that many scholars believe the NAALC is being ill enforced is due to the 
politicization of the job (Jacobs 139; Bieszczat 1403, Human Rights Watch 6). What this means 
is that government compliance is being ensured by a body of government workers. This leads to 
a lack of political will, because political appointees do not want to make their country appear 
incompliant, negligent or cruel (Jacobs 139). This can most obviously be seen in the reasoning 
behind never calling for an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to occur: if the case stops at 
ministerial consultations then no expert (outsider) input can testify to the wrongdoings of the 
government (Jacobs 139). 
The nature of the job is to enforce the NAALC and to adhere to the mission of creating 
better labor standards across North America. Therefore, a more isolated, apolitical body would 
be better able to enforce the agreement (Jacobs 139). “As researcher Cody Jacobs states in his 
article, "Trade We Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor Provisions To Create More 
Equitable Growth In North America," “a permanent supranational body that is more isolated 
from political and diplomatic concerns would be able to provide a much more neutral arbiter of 
the agreement as well as a source of consistent interpretations of the agreement that diplomatic 
negotiations simply cannot provide” (140). An independent body would be able to fully focus 
about on mission of the NAALC and would be less likely to get tied up in the political issues 
taking place in the member countries (Human Rights Watch 2).  
Penalizing Corporations 
 The NAALC, currently, only provides language that holds governments responsible for 
lack of compliance with labor law.  As stated in the Honeywell case, “the NAO review has not 
been aimed primarily at whether or not the two companies named in submission acted in 
violation of Mexican labor law” (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 28). This method 
proves to be problematic because when Mexican workers get terminated, but need money due to 
economic hardships, they feel pressed to take a severance package; like what was seen in the 
Honeywell case (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 29). Under Mexican law once a 
severance package is taken then the worker waives their right to file a claim against their former 
employer (USNAO Submission #94001 and #94002 3). 
 The Honeywell case demonstrates how legal loopholes allow abuses to continue. The 
NAALC only ensures the government is complying with the NAALC and if employees who are 
wrongfully terminated continue taking severance then the Mexican government, under the 
current provisions in the NAALC, the employer can not be held responsible. This system seems 
convenient for the Mexican government and the corporations that have manufacturing plants in 
Mexico. However, I believe the process should not be so easily manipulated. 
 One of the main objectives of the NAALC is to “improve workings and living standards 
in each Party’s territory” (“North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). This goal is 
currently not being met and will never be met if legal loopholes allow for abuses to continue 
occur. Therefore, it seems that the best way to remedy the problem is to add provisions to the 
agreement that would create a means to ensure corporations were complying with the NAALC. 
 If corporations were held accountable for the abuses that occur under their watch, 
government officials may feel more compelled to participate in the dispute-resolution process 
and corporations may begin to worry about workplace violations due to potential penalties. 
 I understand that by including provisions regarding compliance by corporations, the 
agreement would take on a new meaning/function because the current agreement solely aims to 
insure government compliance with domestic law. However, after much review of the cases that 
have gone before the NAOs, I believe the easiest way to ensure workers are being treated fairly 
is to monitor the actions of their employer. Theoretically, this could also increase cooperation by 
the governments when complaints are made to the NAOs because the burden to uphold labor 
standards would not solely be placed on the government.  
Conclusion 
In this section of the paper, I will state my final conclusion.  
The NAALC has been in effect for twenty-three years, yet only thirty-nine submissions 
have ever been made to the NAOs. Furthermore, of those thirty-nine submissions, the farthest 
any of those have gone in the dispute-resolution process is to ministerial-consultations. 
Therefore, we are able to speculate that there has been/ is reluctance by the Ministerial Council, 
made up of the Mexican and United States Secretary of Labor and Canadian Minister of Labor, 
to pursue further examinations of the cases. The lack of political will to fully investigate cases 
and, more importantly, formulate tangible remedies for workers has rendered the NAALC 
useless for workers who submit complaints.  
 As noted in the Case Study and Findings section of the paper, the cases that make it to 
ministerial consultations are considered “successful,” yet individual workers are not ever 
provided substantial remedies. The lack of enforcement power by the NAALC and the 
unwillingness to provide remedies has created doubts in the minds of the workers. These doubts 
that have been created due to the less than ideal solutions created by the Ministerial Council is 
most likely the primary reason only thirty-nine complaints have ever been submitted to the 
NAALC.  
The ineffectiveness of the NAALC, which I have proven throughout the entirely of this 
paper, has made me conclude changes to the structure and function of the NAALC need to occur 
in order to ensure the NAALC upholds the main objectives of the agreement:  the objectives are: 
improving working conditions in North America; promoting a set of eleven labor principles; 
encouraging cooperation to increase productivity and quality; encouraging information 
exchanges to understand the labor laws in each country; pursing cooperative labor-related 
activities; enforcing domestic labor law; and fostering transparency in the administration of labor 
law (“North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”). Since these objectives are not being 
met, I recommend two changes that would help with enforcement and compliance with the 
NAALC. First, create an independent oversight body to enforce the NAALC. Having 
government officials perform this task has proven to be unsuccessful due to the conflicting 
political aspects of the job. Second, create provisions in the text that would allow for the 
NAALC to monitor corporations. If the NAALC could make findings about corporate behavior, 
they could hold corporations accountable for their misdeeds and provide direct recommendations 
or punishments to the corporations.  
  Overall, the lacking will power of the Council on Labor Cooperation to ensure that labor 
standards are being complied with and workers are being remedied has created many doubts for 
workers. The NAALC dispute-resolution process must be fixed in order to ensure fair labor 
practices are occurring in Mexico, Canada and the United States. The NAALC has had twenty-
three years to enhance labor standards and ensure enforcement, but has failed. Due to the lack of 
will power and continued non-compliance, the NAALC must be renegotiated in order to create 
real change for workers in Mexico.  
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